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The Supreme Court of the United States, Its Foundation, MothZ& and
Achievements: An Interpretation. By Charles Evans Hughe New Yorh,
Columbia University Press, 1928. pp. 269.
This book comprises the six lectures which Mr. Hughes gave before
Columbia University in 1927 on the George Blumenthal Foundation. The
title will be apt, perhaps, to raise false hopes. The bulk of the volume is
a survey of American constitutional law, which, while excellent for its
brevity and clarity, is singularly devoid of efforts at interpretation of an
evaluative nature. Just how good or just how bad a piece of work the
Court has, in his opinion, done, Mr. Hughes never once hints.
The chapter that best realizes expectations, though it requires amend-
ment at points, is chapter II, entitled the "Court at Work-Organization-
Methods." It affords (especially in pages 55 to 77) the best account that has
been assembled of the proceedings of the justices behind the wings, and
one which has the further advantage of being authenticated by the fact
that the author himself is a former justice. To be sure, Mr. Hughes tahe3
pains to explain that he is not "revealing confidences" gained during his
incumbency; but the apology seems a bit ungenerous, inasmuch as he has
occasion to cite for many of his statements in this connection two former
justices-Story and Campbell-to whom apparently the idea did not occur
that such an apology was required. Nor in fact was it; for while any
court must naturally do much of its work in private, if there is any organ
of government which is not entitled to have its proceedings shrouded in
secrecy, it is the Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions are
professedly always based on the better reason, and at any rate set metes
and bounds to the power of the other organs.
On page 32 Mr. Hughes writes: "These [constitutional] questions have
been decided after full argument in contested cases and it is only with the
light afforded by a real contest that opinions on questions of the highest
importance can safely be rendered." But Bacon challenged more than 300
years ago the legalist's notion that a contest is the best way to develop the
truth, and the cooperative methods of modem science daily renew this
challenge to the characteristic methods of the law courts. On page 38 it is
further asserted that "judges are constantly sustaining the validity of
legislation which as legislators they would probably condemo." This is
doubtless true of those judges "who have gained a distinct reputation for
their liberal attitude" referred to in this connection, but its accuracy
as regards those judges who are responsible for the present dimensions of
judicial review under the due process of law clause seems to the reviewer
decidedly questionable. (pp. 212-13). On page 49 we read: "But you can-
not expect to have judges worthy of the office who are without convictions
and the question from that point of view is not as to the qualifications of
judges but whether you will have a court of this character and function."
Does this mean that in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court
no account should be taken of their known views on public questions? If
they are chosen because they have convictions, it would seem that the con-
victions th3y have may also be properly considered.
Some other statements involve more definitely factual issues. The char-
acterization on page 37 of the rule laid down in United States v. The DeL
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& Hud. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1909), as "a self-denying
rule" is certainly not accurate for all cases. In the case just mentioned it
enabled the Court to eviscerate an act of Congress without shouldering the
responsibility of declaring it void; and when the rule would have saved an
act it has been sometimes ignored (Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S.
463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141 (1908)). The statement on page 51 that Lincoln, in
his comments on the Dred Scott decision, "gave due respect to the judicial
institution" allows great scope to "respectful" criticism in view of Lincoln's
charge of conspiracy among "Roger, Stephen, and James"--a charge that
we today know to have had a considerable measure of justification. Nor is
it indicated that the decision in the Dred Scott case was unceremoniously
overridden by Congress with Lincoln's assent by the act of 1862 excluding
slavery from the territories. The assurance vouchsafed on page 52 that
"there was no ground . . . for the suggestion that President Grant at-
tempted to pack the court" in order to procure the reversal of the decision
in Hepburn v. Griswold is much too positive. It may be that Grant knew
nothing of that decision (page 53) when he sent in the names of Strong and
Bradley to the Senate, but we have the testimony of both Chase and Bout-
well, Secretary of the Treasury, that the latter did, and that is all that was
necessary to set the proper machinery in motion. Nor should it be over-
looked that Strong had as a member of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
sustained the Legal Tender Act; that Bradley, besides being known as an
advocate of strong War and Reconstruction measures, had all his profes-
sional life been, a railroad attorney (the railroad interest was in 1870 a
debtor interest); and that the decision in Hepburn v. Griswold was virtu-
ally rendered by a minority of the Court, and so by a long standing rule,
abortive. Similarly, the comments on the income tax decision of 1895, on
page 54, overlook the principal ground for public criticism, namely, the
Court's presumption in "correcting a century of error"--in other words,
its reversal of a century's precedents; and the obvious bias of some of the
judges from the state of mind they had permitted themselves to lapse into
regarding "socialism." The doubt expressed, however, whether it was Justice
Shiras who changed his mind on that occasion is well warranted in light of
the positive statement made by the late justice's son at the time of the
latter's death a year or two ago. The vacillating justice, it is scarcely open
to doubt, was Justice Gray. In Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586 (1880),
Gray had joined his brethren in sustaining a national income tax levied by
the rule of uniformity; and he was not among the dissenters in Pollock v.
Farmers' L. & T. Co. (157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673 (1895); 158 U. S.
601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912 (1895)). Also, the views of Justice Brewer, the only
other justice besides Gray and Shiras, whose attitude in the Pollock case
is not a matter of record, were almost certainly in line from the start with
those of his uncle, Justice Field, whose apprehensions regarding socialism
he indulged to the full.
A more particular contribution to history is the anecdote which Mr.
Hughes relates, on the authority of the late Justice Harlan, with regard to
the efforts of the Court to induce Justice Field to resign some time before
he did so (pp. 75-6). Justice Field certainty overstayed his time. A casual
examination of the reports will show that for some years he was far from
carrying his share of the Court's then excessively heavy burden. In the
term of '95 he spoke for the Court in only four very brief opinions, one of
which was required to explain something said in one of the others. In the
'96 term he prepared no opinions for the Court. He sent in his resignation
in April, 1897, indicating the following December 1st as the time when it




The excellent sketch of constitutional law afforded by the Inst four of
Mr. Hughes' lectures duly emphasizes recent developments. Of the nearly
300 cases cited fully two-thirds were decided vithin the last thirty 7c=.
One or two criticisms may be ventured. The statement on page 93 of the
holding in the Newberry case (256 U. S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469 (1921))
should have been accompanied by the explanation that it was rendered un-
der the Constitution as it stood before the addition of the Seventeenth
Amendment, when the election of senators, being by the s-tate legislatures,
was much more evidently separable from the processes of their nomination
than it is today. The reviewer also believes it an error to repreznt the
"clear and present danger" rule as indicating the limit szt by the First
Amendment in protection of freedom of speech and pres against Congress.
The statement quoted on page 166 from the Gitlow case (268 U. S. 652, 666,
45 Sup. Ct. 625, 630 (1925)) and that quoted on page 163 from the Tolcdo
Newspaper case (247 U. S. 402, 419-20, 38 Sup. Ct. 560, 564 (1918)) ap-
pear to give the doctrine of the Court. On page 105 the question of tho
constitutionality of the draft for foreign service, which was the form of
the issue in 1917, is in view of the history of the matter, mistakenly over-
simplified-as indeed it is in Chief Justice White's impatient opinion in
Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1918). Pages 139-
40 suggest, -without answering, the interesting question of the right of
Congress to enact a code of law for the determination of controversies b.-
tween the states.
The book should be of real service to both the layman and the spccial
student. The latter, however, will be somewhat irked by the fact that
Mr. Hughes did not see fit to take us more into his confidence concerning
his own views with respect to the traditions of the Court of which he
was once so distinguished a member.
Princeton, N. J. EDT7AnD S. Can.IN.
The Law of Unfair Competition and Tr'ade Marks. By Harry D. Nims.
(3d ed.), New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1929. pp. cliv, 1293. $20.
Unfairness in business is more than a legal concept; it is a thing which
vitally affects the whole community. Business will have no incentive to
progress and capital will be even more timid than it is, if the legitimate
results of enterprise are to be diverted or development obstructed by unfair
conduct, and the public, which Judge Coxe once called "that vast multitude
which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous," is bound to
suffer because it is the public that is always exploited by the unfair trader.
A book like this is more than a law book; it is a constructive force pro-
moting fair dealing and decency.
There are some offenses against which society is able to protect itself. A
guest who misbehaves is not invited again. The golfer who does not count
his shots finds it hard to get a game. Bores can be avoided. But offenzws
against good business sportsmanship or manners cannot thus easily be
dealt with. Something more is needed, and we now have a body of law
which has come to be called "unfair competition"-the English equivalent
of "concurrence deloyale" which the French used to describe this general
type of tort before we had come definitely to recognize it. This body of
law is the result of the efforts of the courts to stop conduct in business which
shocks judicial sensibilities.
"Unfair competition" is a subject on which there has been a great deal
of fuzzy thinking. The name is inaccurate, and such is the potency of
labels that at one time it seemed likely to be confined to what the English
call "passing off." Unfair competition was asserted to embrace only con-
duct where by some sort of device one trader misrepresentpil his goods as
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those of another. All other business barbarity by inference was fair com-
petition. Happily this calamity was averted, more by accident than by
design. The courts began to speak of "unfair competition" in cases brought
under the anti-trust acts which had nothing to do with misrepresentation
of goods, and this, perhaps more than anything else, allowed the phrase
to escape from its straitjacket. But still the delusion exists that unfair
competition deals only with the sale of goods, even with the markings upon
the packages. Somebody ought to be resourceful enough to get a new name
which will designate the offense which unfair competition really is. Mr.
Nims has been unable to. He told me that he tried and gave it up, and
perhaps it is as imprudent for the author of a successful book to experi-
ment with titles which his customers may not recognize as it is for the
manufacturer of oatmeal to modernize the picture of a Quaker on his car-
tons. There may be a suspicion that the goods are different, and good will
may thus be imperiled. A mere reviewer has no such responsibility.
But before attempting to devise a new label, it may be useful to deter-
mine what is the matter with the old one. "Unfair competition'--"unfair"
is a good enough mild word, but why "competition"? Competition connotes
two traders trying to sell the same goods to the same people. This gives
folks addicted to the consideration of words rather than things a chance to
dodge. They say, "If there is no competition there can be no unfair com-
petition"--which is sound enough when dealing with phrases but not with
facts. Why not say, "If there is no competition there can be no actionable
wrong." When put this way of course it does not make sense; yet this, in
effect, is solemnly said by the courts all the time.
The concern which makes Beechnut bacon and a lot of other goods upon
which they put the Beechnut mark has not made cigarettes. A maker of
cigarettes places the Beechnut mark upon his cigarettes and thus, by
profiting by the Beechnut reputation, gives them a salability which other-
wise they would not have. But cigarettes do not compete with bacon or
chewing gum. There being no competition it was argued there could be
no unfair competition.
R. H. Macy & Company is well known and has a valuable reputation.
It operates a retail store only in New York where everybody knows it as
Macy's. A dealer in Flint, Michigan (whose name was not Macy), opens
a department store there and places a sign with the word "Macy's" over
the door. R. H. Macy & Company has no store in Flint. There is no com-
petition. But there is a wrong.
Thomas A. Edison does not make fountain pens. A maker of fountain
pens (whose name by the way was not Edison) stamps his pens Edison.
There is no competition, but the action is unfair.
Ingersoll watches are advertised and sold at definite prices suggested by
the company producing them. They are recognized as being good value at
these prices. A dealer for some ulterior purpose of his own advertises
Ingersoll watches at less than cost, with the result that the public gets the
impression that the customary prices are excessive and other dealers, being
unwilling also to sell at a loss, decline to deal further in Ingersoll watches.
There is no competition between the Ingersoll Watch Company and the
price-cutting dealer. Or suppose the dealer, to sell other goods, tells people
asking for Ingersoll watches that the pinions are made of lead, and for
purposes of exhibition and to give verisimilitude puts a lead pinion in an
Ingersoll watch, what then? There is no competition between the Ingersoll
Watch Company and the dealer, and "unfair" seems much too delicate a
term to use.
There is an action in rem verso which is recognized in continental Europe
1
I GERMAN CivIL Co E, art. 812; Swiss FEDERAL CODE, art. 70.
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and is described by Baudry and Barde, the French commentators, as "an
action in which a person claims restitution of an increase in wealth created
to his detriment, and without just cause, in the estate of another." That
is to say, it is an actionable wrong for a man to increase his estate by
appropriating something of value belonging to another. A person who has
so conducted himself as to inspire confidence acquires a good reputation.
A good reputation in business is a thing of value. A trade-mark is merely
business reputation symbolized. Therefore, for a man to claim for himself
the good reputation belonging to another, by applying to his goods that
other's trade-mark, would seem to be a wrong coming within this principle.
And so long as the reputation is in fact appropriated, it cannot be impor-
tant that the goods may not compete.
What we are really dealing with and calling unfair competition a
trade rights and duties. The right of a business man is to have full bzn-fit
of the reputation he has established, a part of which is the trade that,
without interference, would normally flow to him; and the duty of others
is to refrain from appropriating this reputation or doing anything to divert
or obstruct the normal flow of trade which probably would result from it
"Trade rights and duties" as the title of a book would probably not con-
vey to anybody the least information of its contents; so it perhaps is best
that I remain in the good company of Mr. Nims and with him confess my
failure to give a name to a subject that I am sure everyone agrees is mis-
named. As long as it is understood that there need be no competition in un-
fair competition, no harm will be done. This is only following conven-
tional linguistics. There is no soda in soda water, no grapes in grape fruit,
no bread in bread fruit, and a clothes horse is not a horse but is good
enough to hang things on.
The development of the law dealing with the subject is interesting. From
its small beginnings in the law of trade marks, through the passing off of
goods by other means than by the imitation of trade marks, it has now
spread out to include all manner of business depravity such as false indi-
cations of geographical origin, misdescription of goods, disparagement,
commercial bribery, misuse of confidential information, inducing breach of
contract, interference with trade relations, intimidation of customers, by
threats, for example, of infringement suits and similar acts, the result of
which is an artificial interference with the normal course of trade.
The law has pantingly pursued the wrongdoer, sometimes catching up
with him, sometimes not. Sometimes the pursuit has led up blind alleys-
sometimes, while stopping to dispute about the classification of the offense,
the offender has been allowed to escape.
There has been much discussion of the nature of the property rights
involved and some philosophizing of a highly artificial kind which a tough-
minded realist is inclined to view with impatience. For these are intensely
practical cases. They deal with the realities of the present, and first of
all they are cases of fact. Take, for example, an ordinary case of misrepre-
sentation involving the misleading marking of goods, the kind of case usu-
ally called one of trade-mark infringement. To a practically minded person
the issue would seem to be one of fact, and the questions to be answered
simple enough. Does the mark in question distinguish the plaintiff's goods?
Is it being used by the defendant so as likely to confute his goods with
the plaintiff's? If so, a wrong is committed which ought to be stopped-
and effectively stopped. What difference can it make by what means the
misrepresentation is made-whether it is by misuse of an arbitrary mark,
a geographical or descriptive or personal name or dress of pachage or con-
figuration of goods-it is all one. Fraud is fraud and it is the fraud and
not the manner of it which calls for the interposition of the law. But
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instead of getting at the matter directly, all manner of refinements have
been invented. The imitation of an arbitrary mark needs one kind of an
action, a personal name another, imitation of a label a third, each calling
for different relief; and thus a lot of rubbish has accumulated.
A trade-mark must be arbitrary and have no reference to the goods;
hence it can identify them. Use by another, then, presumptively misrepre-
sents his goods. But supposing that the evidence shows that there is in
fact no deceit-well, there ought to be, say the courts, and enjoin the use of
the trade-mark. A geographical or personal name is not arbitrary; hence
presumptively it does not identify and is not a trade-mark, and therefore
no deceit can result from its use by the defendant. But supposing the evi-
dence shows that the mark which theoretically cannot identify, in fact does
so and that its use by the defendant does misrepresent-well, it ought not
to, say the courts, and they deny relief or give only a little. Thus does
theory often prevail over fact.
It is time to sweep into the dust-bin many of the refinements which have
been allowed to grow up, and recognize that any mark which in fact enables
goods of one trader to be distinguished in trade from those of others is a
trade-mark, and to represent by any contrivance as the goods of A those
for which he is not responsible is a wrong for which A is entitled to redress,
and that both of these questions are questions of fact-not of theory.
The cases involving personal names are typical. A surname such as
Baker's as applied to chocolate or Ford to cars has come to distinguish
quite as effectively as any arbitrary name possibly could. An infringer uses
the name Baker or Ford on. spurious goods. What difference ought it to
make if his name happen to be Baker or Ford? Is there any right to steal
another's business and seduce his customers by one means rather than an-
other? If so, it is a confession that the law in dealing with fraud has at
last found its limitation. Here again, theory triumphs over fact. The
theory is that a man has a right to use his name in any business he chooses
to enter. The fact is that to use certain surnames in certain businesses
will always result in injury and deception. Which is it better to have, the
injury and deception, or to have certain men restrained from using their
surnames in certain businesses?
The second alternative seems better, and I think we may expect to see
it accepted. It is a logical development. At first no restraint was imposed
on the use a man might make of his own name, then he was obliged to
refrain from using it with imitative accessories. Later he was obliged to
couple it with an announcement of distinction, e.g., "W. H. Baker has no
connection with the old chocolate manufactory of Walter Baker & Co.,"
"not the original Rogers," and the like. More recently he has been re-
strained from applying his name as a name or designation of competing
goods, e.g., Woodbury's Soap, Henderson's seeds, and required to use it as
a part of an address and inconspicuously on the sides or back of packages.
But supposing a situation (and it is not difficult) where every means of
distinction honestly carried out would be idle--what then? And what about
the theoretically absolute right of every man to use his own name in his
own business? When the irresistible force, "No one has any right to repre-
sent his goods as the goods of another," encounters the immovable object
"Every man has a right to use his own name in his own business"-which
will give way? I hope and believe the second.
Mr. Nims in his Chapter VI treats this question fairly and I hope as a
true prophet.
It is as unwise to attempt to define unfair competition as to define fraud.
Definitions limit. Once several years ago, after a course on the subject, a
student who, with an endurance which did him credit, had attended through-
300 [Vol. 39
BOOK. REVIEWS
out, came up to speak to me. I said, "What is your idea of this subject?"
and received the answer, "Well, it seems to me that the courts try to stop
people from playing dirty tricks." One might spend weeks reading cnzas
and find many definitions less satisfactory than this.
Chicago, l.. Evmm S. Ra23.
A History of the English Bar and Attoiatus to 1450. By Herman Cohen.
London, Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1929. pp. x, 622.
Mr. Cohen calls his work a compilation, and it is clear that he has emptied
his files into his book, with the result that we have an immanze amount of
material drawn from the most diverse sources bearing upon the history of
the legal profession. The arrangement is by no means clear, nor is there
the much-needed introduction or conclusion stating the broad results of the
investigation. The reader will therefore do well to bear in mind the relevant
passages of Professor Holdsworth's History as a clue to the maze of matter
here presented.
Nevertheless, the collections of Mr. Cohen are of great interezt and value,
for if they do not give a formal history of the bar down to 1450, they do
give a roughly classified body of material, and historians will be grateful
to him for assembling in one volume so much information. He has read
very widely and has gleaned considerable quantities of matter from Eources
which are primarily non-legal, such as literature in prose and verse, and
chronicles which often relate the progress of monastic litigation from the
point of view of the litigant, his counsel, his expenses, and the steps which
worldly wisdom suggested for furthering a cause, all which matters are
discreetly veiled in the more professional sources of the Year BooTs and
Plea Rolls. The discoveries thus made are related fairly fully, so that the
reader is generally put in immediate possession of the facts and is therefore
in a position to draw his own conclusions. An aspiring historian would find
it a useful exercise to begin where Mr. Cohen leaves off, and diget his
materials into a critical history of the bar.
Mr. Cohen's views on the history of the profession are at timeq somewhat
confused, while on matters of general legal history he several times hazards
opinions which are questionable; it is therefore a work to be used with
caution. Its main purpose, however, is to render available a vast m
of scattered source material, and from this point of view the author can
be credited with a great measure of success. His book is the fruit of much
learned labor, and some of it is of great interest; thus the well-known
opinion that ecclesiastical models influenced the English bar is aptly illus-
trated from the works of William of Drogheda, recently re-edited by
Professor Wahrmund, and this is only one example of the energy with
which Mr. Cohen has searched far and wide for information.
Cambridge, Mass. THEsoam. F. T. PLuc&m-rr.
Annual Survey of English Law, 1928. By the Department of Law of the
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of Lon-
don). London, The London School of Economics and Political Science,
1929. pp. xv, 301.
In spite of its importance, there is little that a reviewer may justly and
safely say of the initial volume in! an annual survey of the development
of English law. He may chronicle the event of its publication, tell what
the book is about, insist that the performance might have been different,
wish the venture god-speed-and that is all.
The book is addressed to the general reader rather than to the lawyer.
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Its concern is with law as a social institution, and not as a body of rules.
Its place is intermediate between casual comments which are current and
histories which must wait to be written. The central idea is to present
a detailed picture of the law in the making; "to furnish the background
required. . . to bring this process into relief"; "to place it in its proper per-
spective in relation to the general body of the law"; to reveal "the processes
of change and development which are constantly in operation," and "to
record the development of legal principles from a critical point of view."
Thus it is at once a work of reference, a survey, and a picture of a
developing institution.
The execution of such a project involves countless judgments, runs ser-
ious hazards, and involves numerous compromises. The plan of the whole,
the division into parts, the selection of materials, the allotment of space,
the method of treatment, all involve choices among many alternatives. As
the work of some eight persons the volume gains in accuracy of statement
at the expense of unity. As a digest of legislation, judicial decision, and
legal treatise, it elevates comprehensiveness above thoroughness. As a
record of all significant facts its sacrifices something of perspective to
currency. It is a product of several men who differ in experience and
penetration, in historical outlook and prophetic insight, in regarding the
essential task as description, narrative, analysis, interpretation, or criticism.
As an immediate statement of the events of a year in the life history
of a law, the book is good enough. It is comprehensive; the record is set
down under eleven headings, Constitutional Law, Local Goveirnment and
Administration, Law of Persons and Family Law, Property and Convey-
ancing, Contract and Agency, Mercantile and Maritime Law, Industrial
Law, Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure, Conflict of Laws, and Inter-
national Law. For reference there is a "table of cases," a list of "acts,
conventions, and documents," and an "index." The statutes are clearly
and succinctly presented in the general language which must bo employed
before the courts have breathed into abstract terms the breath of life;
the decisions are told off, with due regard to the cases directly in point,
but with a commendable absence of indiscriminate citation; the books and
articles are briefly described without bringing "contributions to knowledge"
before the throne for judgment. What one misses most is the illusion
(not delusion) of movement and growth, of a human institution accom-
modating itself to the changing circumstances of society. A general
chapter at the beginning of the book or at the end would have been of
great value. But such an evanescent quality is hard enough for the in-
dividual to capture and set down in his book; perhaps it is too much to
expect of the bigger and better method of cooperative research.
The Survey is an engaging and valuable adventure. But, as the editors
of the volume probably know better than any of us, we really do not know
what happened in English law in 1928. The maxim that the meaning
of it all does not become clear until afterwards holds true in legal history
as well as elsewhere. Magna Carta was not Magna Carta until time
brought meaning into the words; the future of equity was made before
equity was clearly recognized; bills of rights have the habit of establish-
ing rights which those who drew them up had never heard of. A statute
of great current moment may be of little practical importance; a chance
phrase that escapes current notice may be the germ of a code of law;
we never know what the current case really decides until the next case
comes along. The stuff of the law, for 1787, for 1846, for 1928, has the
habit of being remade by the course of unintended events. But, it Is
better to get such a picture as we can of the development of English
law in the last calendar year than to have no picture at all. We are under
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obligations to the staff of the department of law of the London School
because they persisted in taking a look even if they had to sea as through
a glass darkly.
New Haven, Conn. WALTON H. HALrToN.
Cases on Personal Property. By Thomas A. Larremore. Rochester,
Lawyer's Co-Operating Publishing Co., 1928. pp. xv, 640.
In a comparison of this book with the others in this field of law, thre3
striking differences are noted: the large number of cases used, there belng
over three hundred, the subject matter covered and its arrangement
One of the apparent shortcomings of the book is in the selection of some
of the material. The material in the chapters on Property-Tangible and
Intangible, "Property" for the Purpose of Injunctive Relief, Consortium
and Privacy, and Crimes is usually covered in other courses in most law
schools and could have been omitted without detriment to the book. The
cases on Dead Bodies and Base Animals are unusual but may be worth
the space given to them. It is doubtful, however, whether the topicS of
Title Deeds and Heirlooms, and Manure are of such practical value today
that space should be given to them in a case book. Doubtless there is
plenty of material elsewhere in the book suiciently to enrich the minds of
the students without the aid of these chapters. The heading of the chapter,
The Negative Community, is unique, though the well selected cases there-
under bring out the meaning of this term very excellently. The elimination
of the material mentioned above would have enabled the editor to have
inserted additional cases on tacking in the chapter on Prescription. In the
chapter on Pledges, the case of Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, which showa
the measure of damages for the conversion of pledged stock, is used. Other
cases, showing the different rulings on this point, should have been included.
It seems that a rearrangement of some of the material would greatly
add to the value of the book. One of the most obvious changes is in the
position of the chapter on Recaption which should come first, after which
should come the chapter on "General" and "Special" Property, as the cases
in the latter show some of the common law forms of action. Since common
law pleading is not taught in some law schools, or, if so, after the course
on Personal Property, and, since many students begin the study of law
during the summer with the course on Personal Property, it would have
been profitable to have included other cases showing the forms of action.
If it is deemed advisable to include it at all, then the chapter, Bill in Equity,
should have been inserted at this point. The cases under Part VII, What
is Possession, should have been placed in other chapters covering this
material, thus eliminating the somewhat choppy arrangement of the book.
One other possible criticism is that in a large number of eases no reason-
ing is given for the rule %f law propounded, and this is lamentable. In
order to save space, the editor used the expedient of "boiling down" the
facts, and in the main this is to be commended, but cases or excerpts from
cases merely stating the rule should be used sparingly. The reviewer
realizes that the "desirable" case is not always available, but whenever
possible, eases giving the reason or "policy" for the rule are highly desir-
able, especially for those who try to avoid the purely formalistic approach
to the study of law.
Considered as a whole, Professor Larremore's book, in the opinion of
the reviewer, is the best one in this field. The selection of cases and the
treatment of the subject matter of the main topics, which comprise the
larger portion of the book, show the exhaustive and painstaking rezearch
and study the editor did, and the results are highly commendable. Through
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this careful selection of a large number of cases, many problems are pre-
sented which give the teacher an excellent opportunity to show the fine
distinctions drawn by the courts and the process of reasoning involved.
Herein lie the chief merits of the book. Moreover, as the editor points out
in the Preface, the teacher can get away from the "hand-me-down" sets
of notes which accumulate about so many law schools through the use of
the abundance of material and different topics covered. The teacher is
further assisted here by the extensive footnotes which contain many varia-
tions of the problems of the principal case, and for this meritorious work,
nothing but the highest praise can come.
Incidentally the book is well indexed, and in the list of cases, the cases
are cited in both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' names. The black
fabrikoid binding, type, and paper used make for a neat and attractive
volume.
Lawrence, Kan. R. F. PAYNE.
Streik Aussperrung und Berufsverbdinde im neuen Englisehen Arbeitsrecht.
By Dr. Ludwig Hamburger. Berlin, J. Bensheimer, 1929. pp. x, 80.
Until 1927, the recent English enactments dealing with industrial con-
flicts were legislative corrections of judicial action adverse to labor. The
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875,1 was a consequence of
the London gas-stokers' strike in 1872. The prosecution of five of the
strike leaders on a charge of conspiracy and their sentence to twelve
months' imprisonment "created indignation, and led to an impressive dem-
onstration in Hyde Park." 2 In due course the application against strik-
ers of the loose law of conspiracy was mitigated. The Taff Vale case,3
in 1901, powerfully stimulated the growth of the Labor Party and also
the influence of its aims among Liberals.4 These currents of opinion were
registered in the Trade Disputes Act, 1906.5 It is familiar knowledge that
this act relieved trade unions from liability for torts.0 In 1909, the Os-
borne judgment T again roused labor to action, by forbidding trade unions
to use their funds for political purposes.8 The Trade Union Act, 1913,9
once more came to labor's relief. Thus, down to 1927 the modern Eng-
lish law controlling trade union activity expressed the interaction between
the judiciary and Parliament.
The General Strike of 1926 vastly affected the orientation of British
labor. Inevitably, also, it led to a reexamination of the legal status of
British trade unions. The result was a drastic modification of the im-
munities and the privileges which prior legislation had secured for labor.
Unfortunately, the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927,10 was
not a characteristic British product. It was conceived in panic and resent-
ment. The superb moral self-restraint which the British people showed
to the General Strike was not observed when the Tory government pressed
1 38 & 39 VicT. c. 86 (1875).
2 1 GARDINER, LIFE OF SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT (1923) 255 et seq.
3 [1901] A. C. 426.
4 HALDANE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1929).
5 6 EDW. VII, c. 47 (1906).
DIcEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND (2d ed.) xlix ct seq.
(note).
7 [1910] A. C. 87.
8 See inter alia, WEBB, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1920) 631-34;
Geldart, The Status of Trade Unions in England (1912) 25 HARv. L. REV.
579; GELDART, PRESENT LAW OF TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS (1914)
(pamphlet).
9 2 & 3 GEO. V, c. 30 (1913).10 17 & 18 GEo. V, c. 22 (1927).
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for legislation to provide safeguards against a future recurrence of such
a strike." And so it put upon the statute books an act characterized by
the former Lord Chief Justice as "vaguer and more indefinite" in its
penal provisions "than the language of any Bill that I ever remember see-
ing which had to go for interpretation before the Courts of Justice."2
The act not only contains language too treacherous for judicial application;
it also curbed trade unions in matters wholly unrelated to the circum-
stances of the General Strike.
In the pamphlet under review, Dr. Hamburger gives an admirably lucid
and well-balanced account of the history and meaning of this legislation.
It serves as a valuable chapter on the relation of legislation to social
policy. But the significance of the act will happily be short-lived. The
temper of the British is too steady to have allowed the resentment which
was the impulse to this legislation to provoke resentment against it so
as to tempt its enforcement And now, that a calmer atmosphere has
again entered English political life, the act will not merely remain a
dead letter; it promises soon to be formally modified. Sir W. A. Jowitt,
the present Attorney General, has already given notice oh behalf of the
MacDonald government, that the government would press a bill for the
amendment of the act.' 3
Cambridge, Mass. FE=x FaNsrURT.
" See the speech of the Marquess of Reading, 68 HANs. DM. (Lords)
69-70 (1927).
2 The Marquess of Reading in 68 HANs. Dmn. (Lords) 839 (1927).
" 229 HANS. DEB. (Commons) 45 (1929).
Rsvmwnas iN THIn ISSUn
EDWARD S. CoRwIN is a Professor at Princeton University. He is the
author of numerous treatises and articles on Constitutional Law.
EDWAD S. Ross is a member of the Illinois Bar and is engaged in prac-
tice in Chicago, Ill. He is the author of GoOD WILT, T2Mz-1L,% , UN-
FAIR TRADING (1915).
THEODORE F. T. PLUcxNErT is Assistant Professor of Legal History in
Harvard University and the General Editor for the Ames Foundation.
WALTON H. HAMILTON is a Professor at the Yale Law School Professor
Hamilton was head of the Robert 'Brookings Graduate School of Eco-
nomics.
R. F. PAYNE is a Professor at the University of Kansas School of Law.
FELIX FRANKFummE is a Professor at the Harvard Law School. He is
shortly publishing a work entitled TnE LAEOa INtNCTION.
19291
